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WILL THE VICTOR BE DENIED THE SPOILS?
CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES
TO PATRONAGE DISMISSALS
By Marita K. Marshall*
"Patronage is the root evil of politics. It keeps people in bondage."
-Arthur Telcser, Republican
member of the Illinois House
of Representatives. 1
"To the victor belong the spoils" 2 is the familiar party chant when a
new political party comes into power. Government employees who are
unprotected by the civil service system3 are dismissed from their jobs and
are replaced by faithful and politically active members of the incoming
party. The term "patronage" refers to this practice of hiring and firing
government employees on the basis of their political affiliation.'
The issue of patronage dismissals is worthy of careful consideration
because of its importance to millions of Americans. Public employment has
* Member, second year class.
1. M. TOLCHIN & S. TOLCHIN, TO THE VICTOR . . .3 (1971) [hereinafter cited
as TOLCHIN & TOLCHIN].
2. From a remark attributed to William Learned Marcy, former governor of New
York: "To the victor belong the spoils of the enemy." Id. at 323.
3. Civil service refers to the system of government employment, on federal, state,
or local levels, in which the criteria for employment (qualifications, selection procedures,
classifications, pay schedules, retention, and promotion factors) are set forth in statutory
form. The modem federal civil service system was founded by the Pendleton Act, ch. 27,
22 Stat. 403 (1883), and is governed by parts two and three of title five of the United
States Code. Civil service systems also exist at the state and local levels. In setting up a
civil service system the legislature decides which government positions will be included in
the system and further designates some positions as competitive, based on examinations,
and others as excepted, based on other statutory provisions. For the purposes of this note,
the key feature of the civil service system is that employment is based on merit: hiring
depends on merit, not political affiliation (see 5 U.S.C. § 3301 (1970)) and firing must be
for cause with proper procedural safeguards (see 5 U.S.C. § 7501 (1970)).
4. Patronage practices can be traced to the beginning of the American republic.
When Thomas Jefferson assumed the presidency in 1801 he replaced the Federalists with
enough Republicans to assure, as he said, a more even distribution between the parties. It
is generally agreed that patronage practices reached their corrupt apex during the adminis-
tration of Andrew Jackson, though Abraham Lincoln used the spoils system far more ex-
tensively. After his first victory in 1860 Lincoln removed 1195 out of 1520 presidential
appointees to make room for his own supporters.
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grown steadily in the twentieth century and constitutes a significant compo-
nent of the total national work force.5 Yet public employees in patronage
jobs have enjoyed little, if any, job security and have been expected to
accept the prospect of dismissal as an inevitable result of the shifting politi-
cal tides. Dismissed public employees who sought legal redress on the basis
of a patronage termination found little comfort in the courthouse. The
courts' traditional response was that unless protected by civil service, public
employees had no right to employment and could be dismissed at will.6
Constitutional challenges to patronage dismissals first appeared in
Alomar v. Dwyer,7 but the court denied relief to the dismissed public em-
ployee, finding no violation of her constitutional rights. In Illinois State
Employees Union v. Lewis,8 however, the dismissal of non-policy-making
employees for refusing to change their political party affiliation was held to
violate the employees' First Amendment rights.9
The conflict in the lower courts was at least partially resolved when the
United States Supreme Court addressed the question of the constitutionality
of patronage dismissals for the first time in Elrod v. Burns."° In Elrod, the
newly elected Democratic Sheriff of Cook County, Illinois, following tradi-
tional practice, fired three Republican employees of his office. The dis-
charged employees" brought suit in federal district court alleging that the
sole reason for their discharge was their lack of affiliation with or sponsor-
ship by the Democratic Party, and seeking, inter alia, declaratory and in-
junctive relief. The district court dismissed their complaint for failure to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted, but the appellate court,
The creation of the civil service system in 1883 cut into the influence of the patron-
age system. By 1939, all states were compelled to initiate merit systems for employees
engaged in programs aided by federal funds. By 1950, 75% of all American cities had
some formal type of merit system, but only 25% of the cities coxered all employees. Al-
most half of the reporting cities with populations of less than 25,000 had no formal civil
service system. TOLCHIN & TOLCHIN, supra note 1, at 323-28.
5. Today almost 15 million persons are employed by federal, state, and local gov-
ernments, with the state and local work force of nearly 12 million persons comprising the
bulk of public employment. Of these, only about half are covered by civil service. The
figures suggest that the issue of patronage dismissals as directly affecting job and
economic security is an urgent one for at least 10% of the total American work force.
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT
OF THE UNITED STATES 242, 272 (96th ed. 1975).
6. E.g., Norton v. Blaylock, 285 F. Supp. 659, 662-63 (W.D. Ark. 1968),
aff'd, 409 F.2d 772 (8th Cir. 1969); American Fed'n of State, County and Municipal
Employees v. Shapp, 443 Pa. 527, 280 A.2d 375 (1971).
7. 447 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1020 (1972).
8. 473 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 943 (1973).
9. Id. at 576.
10. 96 S. Ct. 2673 (1976).
11. A fourth Republican employee, who claimed imminent danger of discharge,
joined in the suit. Id. at 2679.
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relying on its earlier decision in Lewis, reversed and remanded."2 Certiorari
was granted and the Supreme Court affirmed the result in a 5-3 decision,
holding that the discharged employees stated a valid claim for deprivation of
their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.13 In a broad plurality opinion,
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and White, suggested that
hiring as well as firing non-policy-making public employees because of
political affiliation was constitutionally impermissible. A narrower concur-
rence by Justice Stewart, in which Justice Blackmun joined, limited its
decision to the firing situation presented by the facts of the case.14 The
question of the constitutionality of patronage hirings, therefore, remains
open.
This note examines the question of patronage practices in light of the
Elrod decision. It begins with a consideration of the constitutional issue
involved: the First Amendment right of freedom of political association, and
the limitations that may legitimately be placed on this right. The note then
briefly examines a line of Supreme Court decisions in which the Court
developed constitutional guidelines directly applicable to the patronage situ-
ation. The prior patronage dismissal cases are reviewed, followed by a
discussion of the holding and separate opinions in Elrod. Finally, the author
comments on the future of patronage practices after Elrod and suggests that
some problems remain in applying the decision and extending its holding to
hiring practices.
I. Constitutional Issues Raised
by Patronage Practices
A. First Amendment Freedom of Association
The major constitutional objection to patronage dismissals is the in-
fringement of the freedom of political belief and association protected by the
First Amendment. This aspect of the First Amendment insures that an indi-
vidual may choose his own political beliefs and associate with those sharing
similar beliefs without undue interference or the imposition of penalties by
the government.
15
'The Supreme Court has afforded special protection to First Amendment
rights:
12. 509 F.2d 1133 (7th Cir. 1975).
13. 96 S. Ct. at 2689.
14. Justice Powell wrote a dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice Burger and
Justice Rehnquist concurred, and the Chief Justice also filed a separate. dissent. Justice
Stevens did not participate in the decision of the case.
15. See generally R. HORN, GROUPS AND THE CONSTITUTION (1971); Emerson,
Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression, 74 YALE L.J. 1 (1964); Fellman,
Constitutional Rights of Association, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 74; Rice, The Constitutional
Right of Association, 16 HASTINGS L.J. 491 (1965).
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These [First Amendment] freedoms are delicate and vulnerable, as well
as supremely precious in our society. The threat of sanctions may deter
their exercise almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions.
Because First Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive,
government may regulate in the area only with narrow specificity."8
While political activity is not specifically guaranteed by the Bill of Rights,
freedom of association, especially political association, has been recognized
as within the scope of the First Amendment:
Our form of government is built on the premise that every citizen shall
have the right to engage in political expression and association. This
right was enshrined in the First Amendment of the Bill of Rights. Exer-
cise of these basic freedoms in America has traditionally been through
the media of political associations. 7
While stressing the primary importance of First Amendment rights, the
Court has also recognized that these rights are not absolute. Some restric-
tions on political association have been sustained in the face of important
government interests. In United Public Workers v. Mitchell,' s and later in
Civil Service Commission v. National Association of Letter Carriers,9 the
Court sustained provisions of the Hatch Act2 ' that restricted the partisan
political activities of federal civil service employees.!" The public em-
ployees' interests in political action were protected by the First Amendment,
but the strong government interest in keeping the federal civil service free of
partisan politics was held to justify the rather severe restrictions on First
Amendment rights. 2 The Court stressed that the congressional intent was to
16. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963) (citations omitted).
17. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957). see United States v.
Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 263 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965);
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430 (1963); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516,
522-23 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958).
The freedom of association is protected not only against federal encroachment, but
also against state infringement by reason of the Fourteenth Amendment. Kusper v. Pon-
tikes, 414 U.S. 51, 56-57 (1973); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30-31 (1968). In
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), the Court stated that "freedom to engage in
association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the 'lib-
erty' assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces
freedom of speech." Id. at 460.
18. 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
19. 414 U.S. 548 (1973).
20. 5 U.S.C. §§ 7321-27 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
21. The first Hatch Act (ch. 410, 53 Stat. 1147 (1939)) applied restrictions on pub-
lic employees other than those in top policy posts, prohibiting certain political activities
that were clearly defined in the statute. Violations could result in fines, imprisonment, or
both for the offender. The second Hatch Act (ch. 640, 54 Stat. 767 (1940)) clarified the
original act and extended its prohibitions to state and local employees paid in full or in
part with public funds.
22. Civil Service Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 565
(1973); United'Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 96-97 (1947). Restrictions on
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insure impartial execution of the laws. To achieve that end, it was permissi-
ble to forbid public employees to play substantial roles in partisan political
campaigns, take formal positions in a political party, or run for office on a
partisan ticket.
When the government attempts to curtail the exercise of a fundamental
right such as the freedom of association, its action will -be subject to strict
judicial scrutiny.2" Under a strict scrutiny test, the government must dem-
onstrate a compelling state interest that justifies the infringement of First
Amendment rights24 and must show that its goals cannot be achieved by
means less restrictive of First Amendment rights. 5 The burden of proof is
on the state to justify its restrictions on First Amendment freedoms: "Even a
' "significant interference" with protected rights of political association'
may be sustained if the State demonstrates a sufficiently important interest
and employs means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of as-
sociational freedoms. "26
In those cases involving public employment, the Court appears to use a
somewhat less exacting standard of review. The Court has recognized that
the state has special interests as an employer that may justify the use of a
balancing test rather than a strict scrutiny test. In Pickering v. Board of
Education,27 the Court held that the dismissal of a public school teacher due
to his public criticism of school board policies was an impermissible viola-
tion of free speech, but, at the same time, the Court stated:
[T]he State has interests as an employer in regulating the speech' of its
employees that differ significantly from those it possesses in connection
with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general. The problem in
any case is to arrive at a balance between the interests of the teacher, as a
citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of
the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public
services it performs through its employees.2"
The Court has also stated that the terms of public employment must be
partisan political activities of state employees were upheld despite constitutional objection
in Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
23. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976) (citing NAACP v. Alabama, 357
U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958)).
24. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S.
415, 438 (1963); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama,
357 U.S. 449, 464-66 (1958).
25. Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 59 (1973); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S.
258, 268 (1967); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
26. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976).
27. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
28. Id. at 568. See Slochower v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956), in which
the Court noted that the state has broad powers in the selection and discharge of its em-
ployees, and discharge may be proper if, upon inquiry, it appears that an employee's con-
tinued employment is inconsistent with a real interest in the state. Id. at 559.
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"reasonable, lawful and non-discriminatory," 29 suggesting a less than com-
pelling government interest is required.
Even though a lesser state interest is necessary in the public employ-
ment cases, the Court still requires that the end be achieved by the least
drastic means. In Shelton v. Tucker,3" a state statute compelling every
teacher to file an annual affidavit listing all organizational ties as a condition
of employment was held to violate the individual's freedom of association.
The Court stated that
even though the government purpose be legitimate and substantial, that
purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle personal liberties
when the end can be more narrowly achieved. The breadth of legislative
abridgement must be reviewed in light of less drastic means for achiev-
ing the same basic purpose.31
In a number of Supreme Court decisions involving the conditioning of
public employment on the abridgment of constitutional rights, the Court
resolved the issue of competing state interests and individual constitutional
rights in favor of the employee. These cases provide a background for
understanding the conflicting opinions in Elrod v. Burns.32
B. Conditioning Government Benefits on Waiver of Constitutional Rights
1. The "Right-Privilege" Distinction
Traditionally, government employment has been considered a privilege
to which public employees, in the absence of statutory protection, have no
constitutional right. If there is no right to a job, the courts reasoned, a
government employer may dismiss any of its employees at will. This "no
right to public employment" rationale for justifying public employee dis-
missals grew out of a comment made by Justice Holmes in McAuliffe v.
Mayor of New Bedford.33 In dismissing the petition of a policeman fired for
violating a regulation that restricted his political activities, Justice Holmes
stated:
The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has
no constitutional right to be a policeman. There are few employments for
hire in which the servant does not agree to suspend his constitutional
rights of free speech . . . . [H]e takes the employment on the terms
which are offered him. On the same principle, the city may impose any
reasonable condition upon holding offices within its control.34
The court in Bailey v. Richardson35 reiterated this concept by holding that
the Constitution does not prohibit the dismissal of government employees
29. Slochower v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 555 (1956).
30. 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
31. Id. at 488 (emphasis added).
32. 96 S. Ct. 2673 (1976).
33. 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892).
34. Id. at 220, 29 N.E. at 517-18.
35. 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided Court,
341 U.S. 918 (1951).
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because of political beliefs, activities, or affiliations, as the "First Amend-
ment guarantees free speech and assembly, but it does not guarantee Gov-
ernment employ."" Courts have frequently relied on the Bailey case when
dismissing patronage claims.3"
2. The Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions
This so-called right-privilege distinction has been largely replaced by
the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, which states that the government
may not condition the receipt of its benefits or largess on the surrender of
constitutional rights.38 The argument as applied to public employment is that
the government need not create public jobs, but once it voluntarily elects to
do so it may not deny, terminate, or condition public employment in a
manner inconsistent with the Constitution. Therefore, even though there is
no right to public employment, such employment, once granted, may not be
unconstitutionally conditioned. 9 The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions
has been articulated in a series of cases in which the Court rejected govern-
ment attempts to condition the receipt of benefits on the relinquishment or
conditioning of a constitutional right, particularly a First Amendment
right.40
Two decisions cited as direct authority for the Elrod v. Burns plural-
ity opinion41 illustrate this doctrine in the field of public employment. In
Keyishian v. Board of Regents,42 a state statute required faculty members of
a New York state university to sign certificates stating that they were not,
and whether they had ever been, members of the Communist Party. Justice
36. Id. at 59.
37. E.g., Alomar v. Dwyer, 447 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1020 (1972) (Bailey cited as primary authority for dismissal).
38. See generally Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in
Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968).
39. This theory of unconstitutional conditions can be traced to Justice Sutherland's
remarks in Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583 (1926), in
which the Court held that the government cannot condition the receipt of its benefits on
the surrender of an individual's express constitutional rights: "It would be a palpable in-
congruity to strike down an act of state legislation which, by words of express divest-
ment, seeks to strip the citizen of rights guaranteed by the federal Constitution, but to
uphold an act by which the same result is accomplished under the guise of a surrender of
a right in exchange for a valuable privilege which the state threatens otherwise to with-
hold . . . . If the state may compel the surrender of one constitutional right as a condi-
tion of its favor, it may, in like manner, compel a surrender of all." Id. at 593-94.
40. E.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (denial of unemployment com-
pensation to Seventh Day Adventist for refusing Saturday employment violated freedom
of religion); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) (declaration of belief in God as
prerequisite for notary public commission held to violate freedom of belief); Wieman v.
Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952) (exclusion from employment for failure to take a loyalty
oath violated due process).
41. 96 S. Ct. 2673, 2682-83 (1976).
42. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
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Brennan, writing for the Court, invalidated the state law as vague and
overbroad, tending to stifle free expression.43 The Court noted approvingly
the language used by then Court of Appeals Judge Thurgood Marshall in an
earlier stage of the case: "[T]he theory that public employment which may
be denied altogether may be subjected to any conditions, regardless of how
unreasonable, has been uniformly rejected."" The importance of the
Keyishian decision as applied to the patronage situation was stressed by
Justice Brennan in his Elrod opinion: "Keyishian squarely held that political
association alone could not, consistently with the First Amendment, consti-
tute an adequate ground for denying public employment." 45
In Perry v. Sindermann,46 the state board of regents voted not to renew
the contract of a state college teacher with ten years' service allegedly
because of the teacher's criticism of the college's policies. The Court, in an
opinion by Justice Stewart, held that such state action would violate the
teacher's First Amendment right of free speech. The lack of a contractual or
tenured right to re-employment alone did not defeat the claim:
For at least a quarter-century, this Court has made cldar that even
though a person has no "right" to a valuable governmental benefit and
even though the government may deny him the benefit for any number of
reasons, there are some reasons upon which the government may not
rely. It may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his
constitutionally protected interests-especially, his interest in freedom of
speech.4"
The preceding discussion of the right of political association and the
Supreme Court decisions relating to dismissals of public employees provide
some constitutional guidelines for assessing the patronage situation:
(1) The First and Fourteenth Amendments protect the freedom of polit-
ical association of public employees from infringement by state action.
Public employment cannot be conditioned on the surrender of these rights.48
(2) Freedom of political association of public employees is not abso-
lute; a significant impairment of this right can be justified if the government
interest is at least substantial and legitimate.49
(3) If the government interest is to prevail over a First Amendment
right, the means used by the state must be the least restrictive of individual
rights."0
43. Id. at 604, 608.
44. Id. at 605-06 (quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 345 F.2d 236, 239 (2d
Cir. 1965)).
45. 96 S. Ct. at 2682.
46. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
47. Id. at 597.
48. See text accompanying notes 15, 17, 42-47 supra.
49. See text accompanying notes 18-29 supra.
50. See text accompanying notes 30-31 supra.
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II. Patronage Dismissals
A. Case Law Prior to Elrod v. Burns
Despite the development of case law regarding the dismissals of public
employees, the courts refused to apply those principles in the patronage
situation. Relying on the "no right to public employment" theory, the
courts consistently dismissed plaintiffs' complaints.
The case ofAlomar v. Dwyer5 illustrates the early treatment of patron-
age dismissals. Democrat Daisy Alomar worked for the city of Rochester,
New York for three years as a social worker, an administrative job with no
policy-making functions. Though her job performance had been satisfac-
tory, a newly elected Republican city manager fired Alomar for refusing to
change her party affiliation. Alomar claimed a violation of her First
Amendment right of political association, but the court, relying on Bailey v.
Richardson,52 upheld her dismissal. Because Alomar was not protected by
civil service, the court held that her employment was terminable at will.53
A different treatment of patronage dismissals appeared in American
Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees v. Shapp,5 in which
the court held that public employees who had accepted patronage positions
knowing of the possibility of dismissals had waived their right to object to
subsequent discharge for political reasons.55 In Shapp, the newly elected
Democratic governor of Pennsylvania fired 2,000 public employees, all
Republicans, who were not protected by civil service. The employees, with-
out specifically citing First Amendment infringement, claimed that political
affiliation was an improper ground for discharge and alleged a denial of due
process.56 The court held that the employees had failed to establish a con-
stitutional right to continued employment, but did not discuss First Amend-
ment rights.5" Language in Shapp indicated regret at finding it necessary to
sustain the patronage system and suggested there was a need to limit and
greatly reduce the effect of patronage practices.5" But the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court could find no statutory or constitutional basis to indict the
51. 447 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1020 (1972).
52. 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided Court,
341 U.S. 918 (1951).
53. 447 F.2d at 483.
54. 443 Pa. 527, 280 A.2d 375 (1971).
55. Id. at 535, 280 A.2d at 378.
56. Id. at 531, 280 A.2d at 376.
57. Id. at 535, 280 A.2d at 378.
58. "Regretfully for many of us, who believe that politics and political influence or
patronage should be greatly limited and greatly reduced, and that able State employees,
whose livelihood will be jeopardized, should not be discharged for political reasons, we
are compelled to hold that the Governor of Pennsylvania has the power to hire and fire at
will any and all employees who are not Constitutionally or Statutorily protected-
irrespective of their ability, their politics or their political connections." Id. at 536, 280
A.2d at 378.
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system: "Those who, figuratively speaking, live by the political sword must
be prepared to die by the political sword." 59
The dissenting opinion in Shapp, however, did recognize the First
Amendment challenge to patronage dismissals. Justice Barbieri wrote that
the majority holding "may be consonant with familiar concepts of patronage
and the 'spoils system' " but it is "in disregard of the plaintiff-employees'
First Amendment right of freedom of association." 6 Further, "[i]t is true
that no case has ever decided that the 'spoils system' is unconstitutional, but
the clear implication of many United States Supreme Court decisions may
require just that result."'" Justice Barbieri went on to review those Supreme
Court decisions in which the Court struck down governmental attempts to
condition continuing public employment on denial of the exercise of First
Amendment rights. He concluded that a government employee may not be
dismissed solely because of his political viewpoint or association."
The first decision to hold that patronage dismissals infringe First
Amendment rights was Illinois State Employees Union v. Lewis.3 In Lewis,
the newly appointed Republican secretary of state, filling the unexpired term
of a Democrat, dismissed a large number of non-civil servike employees of
his office. The dismissed employees filed an action claiming their dismissals
were based on political affiliation due to their refusal to join or support the
Republican Party and that such dismissals violated their rights under the
First and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court entered summary
judgment for the defendant, but the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
reversed and remanded.
In rejecting the teaching of Bailey and the holdings of Alomar and
Shapp, then Court of Appeals Judge John Paul Stevens decided that non-
policy-making state employees not protected by civil service may not be
discharged solely for refusing to transfer political allegiance from one party
to another. By requiring the employees to choose between professing al-
legiance to the Republican Party or losing their jobs, the state government
had abridged the employees' First Amendment rights.64 For Judge Stevens,
constitutional considerations were not foreclosed by the fact that the "spoils
system has been entrenched in American history for almost two hundred
years" 65 because complete surrender of a citizen's First Amendment rights
could never be justified in the name of tradition.66
59. Id.
60. Id. at 538, 280 A.2d at 379 (Barbieri, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 539, 280 A.2d at 380.
62. Id. at 544, 280 A.2d at 382.
63. 473 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 943 (1973).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 568 (citing Alomar v. Dwyer, 447 F.2d 482, 4S3 (2d Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1020 (1972)).
66. Id. at 569, 572.
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The court in Lewis noted that although complete surrender of First
Amendment rights could never be justified, state interests, if strong enough,
might justify some curtailment of such freedom.67 The state interest in
conditioning employment on political affiliation might be justified, the court
reasoned, in the case of policy-making employees. Without specifically
defining the scope of policy-making employees,68 the court held that it
would be very difficult to account for dismissals of non-policy-making em-
ployees, and cited janitors, elevator operators, driver's license examiners,
and school teachers as examples of employees with no responsibility for
determining policy.69
The reasoning in Lewis was slow to achieve acceptance. When public
employees in Indiana were dismissed for patronage reasons, the employees
brought suit in Indiana State Employees Association v. Negley7° for viola-
tion of First Amendment rights, relying on the Seventh Circuit's decision in
Lewis. The district court viewed the Lewis decision as a narrow holding,
limited to non-policy-making employees, and indicated that the dismissed
employees failed clearly to establish their status or prove the reasons for
their discharge." The court also viewed the action as a test case to impose an
absolute tenure system of public employment in Indiana and, relying on
Bailey andAlomar, denied plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction."
B. The Opinions in Elrod v. Burns
The plurality opinion inElrod, written by Justice Brennan, held that the
practice of patronage dismissals violates the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments because such dismissals severely restrict political belief and associa-
tion, which constitute the core of activities protected by the First Amend-
ment.73 In order for the Republican respondents in Elrod to maintain their
jobs, they were required to pledge their political allegiance to the Democra-
tic Party, contribute a portion of their wages to the Democratic Party, or
obtain the sponsorship of a member of the Democratic Party. The individu-
al's true political beliefs were compromised and he faced a dilemma. He
maintained membership in his own party at the risk of losing his job. Any
support he gave to the new party in terms of money or allegiance diminished
67. Id. at 572.
68. The court stated that whether an employee could be classified as "policy-
making" would be a question for the trier of fact. Id. at 574. In the later Elrod decision,
policy-making employees were generally defined as those employees who have a role in
policy formulation and who can exercise discretion in the performance of their duties. 96
S. Ct. at 2687. See text accompanying notes 82-83 infra.
69. 473 F.2d at 574.
70. 357 F. Supp. 38 (S.D. Ind. 1973).
71. Id. at 42.
72. Id. at 44.
73. 96 S. Ct. at 2689.
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his support of his own party. As a result, his freedom of political association
and belief was restrained. 7"
Because of these restrictions, Justice Brennan concluded that such a
practice ran counter to court decisions that had invalidated government
action that inhibited belief and association in a like manner. Specifically,
patronage practices fell squarely within the prohibitions of Keyishian and
Perry.5 Applied to the patronage situation, the plurality found that the
threat of dismissal for failure to support the favored party inhibited political
belief and association, and actual dismissal punished its exercise."
Although patronage practices clearly infringe First Amendment rights,
the plurality in Elrod recognized that such rights are not absolute and may be
restricted to serve a vital government interest.77 A significant impairment of
First Amendment rights must survive exacting scrutiny, however, and the
burden is on the government to show that the interest advanced is
paramount, the means chosen are the least restrictive of the freedom of
association, and the benefit gained outweighs the loss of constitutionally
protected rights.8
Justice Brennan then examined the interests that the government ad-
vanced as justifying the retention of patronage. The first argument was that
under the patronage system employees will be of the same political party as
their elected supervisors and will have more incentive to work effectively.
The government, therefore, will operate more efficiently.79 Unpersuaded,
the plurality found no legitimate connection between job performance and
similar political persuasion. The inefficiency in the wholesale replacement
of large numbers of employees actually retards effective government. Out-
going employees have little incentive to perform if they know their replace-
ment is imminent. Furthermore, the plurality found no evidence to indicate
that new patronage employees are more qualified to perform the job than the
ones replaced. In any case, Justice Brennan concluded that a less drastic
means was available for insuring government efficiency as incompetent
employees may always be dismissed for good cause, such as insubordination
or poor job performance."0
A second argument advanced to justify patronage was the need for
political loyalty of employees in order fully to implement new administra-
tive policies."1 Loyal subordinates of the same party will not discredit the
party nor attempt to sabotage its programs, but rather will work to carry out
74. Id. at 2681.
75. Id. at 2683; see text accompanying notes 42-47 supra.
76. 96 S. Ct. at 2683.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 2684.
79. Id. at 2685.
80. ld. at 2686.
81. Id. at 2687.
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the policies presumably mandated by the electorate. The plurality recog-
nized this interest as a legitimate goal, but held that the end could be
achieved by the less drastic means of limiting dismissals to policy-making
employees, for whom considerations of personal loyalty and political affilia-
tion are recognized as appropriate criteria for employment. But such criteria
are not justified when applied to non-policy-making employees such as
janitors, elevator operators, and file clerks. The plurality recognized that it
will be difficult to draw a clear line between policy-making and non-policy
making employees, but stated that the "nature of the responsibilities is
critical." 8 2 The deciding factor will be whether the public employee acts as
an advisor or is engaged in formulating or implementing policies of the
particular government office or agency.
83
The third argument presented by patronage advocates was the preserva-
tion of the democratic process.84 While recognizing this interest as an impor-
tant public concern, the plurality expressed doubt that the elimination
of patronage practices would cause the demise of party politics. Justice
Brennan concluded that whatever contribution patronage has made to the
elective process was diminished by its "impediment to the associational and
speech freedoms which are essential to a meaningful system of democratic
government." 85
For the plurality, the issue in Elrod was the resolution of conflicting
interests under the First Amendment: the free functioning of political parties
and the individual freedom of political belief. Justice Brennan concluded
that if political parties and campaigning are to continue, each citizen must be
free to believe as he will and continue to act and associate according to his
beliefs. Therefore, wholesale patronage dismissals are not the least restric-
tive means of achieving an efficient and effective government, of insuring
the implementation of the electorate's sanctioned policies, or of contributing
to the democratic process. The government's interest can be satisfied by
limiting patronage dismissals to policy-making employees.88
Justices Stewart and Blackmun concurred in the result but limited their
opinion to the firing situation,8" apparently refusing to join the plurality
because of its broad implications for hiring as well.
The main thrust of Justice Powell's dissenting opinion was that the
decision was neither constitutionally required nor did it best serve the inter-
ests of democracy.88 In disposing of respondent's First Amendment




85. Id. at 2688.
86. Id. at 2689.
87. Id. at 2690 (Stewart, J., concurring in the result).
88. Id. at 2691 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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County and Municipal Employees v. Shapp89 that such employees benefitted
from their political association in being hired, knew the political practices of
the office, and thus could not challenge the system when it was their turn to
be replaced. Whatever First Amendment rights respondents could have
claimed, their rights were waived on acceptance of the patronage job. Jus-
tice Powell, however, was forced to recognize the validity of the plurality's
argument:
It is difficult to disagree with the view, as an abstract proposition, that
government employment ordinarily should not be conditioned upon
one's political beliefs or activities. But we deal here with a highly practi-
cal and rather fundamental element of our political system, not the
theoretical abstractions of a political science seminar."
Justice Powell then stated his fundamental objection to the plurality opinion:
"In concluding that patronage hiring practices are unconstitutional, the
plurality seriously underestimates the strength of the government interest-
especially at the local level-in allowing some patronage hiring practices,
and it exaggerates the perceived burden on First Amendment rights."'"
For the dissenters, balancing the state and individual interests resolved
the issue in favor of the government. The determining factor was the sig-
nificant contribution made by the patronage system to the " democratization
of American politics.'"'9 The dissent traced the historical development of
patronage in an attempt to justify its continued existence, and stressed the
importance of patronage to the political process in broadening the base of
participation and increasing the volume of political discourse. Justice Powell
concluded that patronage encouraged stable political parties and thereby
reduced excessive political fragmentation.9" The dissenters felt that the
thinking of the plurality reflected "a disturbing insensitivity to the political
realities," 94 and was naive in thinking that the ongoing activities of local
political organizations could be sustained without the hope of some tangible
reward such as a job.
Chief Justice Burger, who concurred in Justice Powell's dissent, added
in his separate dissent that the Court was intruding into an aea reserved for
the legislature and that the choice of patronage practices in state government
was an area of state concern guaranteed by the Tenth Ameridment.95
89. 443 Pa. 527, 280 A.2d 375 (1971).
90. 96 S. Ct. at 2693 (Powell, J., dissenting).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 2691.
93. Id. at 2694-95.
94. Id. at 2694.
95. Id. at 2690-91 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). "The Court strains the rational
bounds of First Amendment doctrine and runs counter to longstanding practices that are
part of the fabric of our democratic system to hold that the Constitution commands some-
thing it has not been thought to require for 185 years. For all that time our system has
wisely left these matters to the States and, on the federal level, to the Congress." Id. at
2690 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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C. Cohffict in the Elrod Opinions
Examination of the plurality and dissenting opinions reveals some
marked philosophical differences and varying interpretations of existing
case law.
Before addressing the merits of the case Justice Powell echoed Chief
Justice Burger's dissent by accusing the plurality of interfering with legis-
lative functions and of trivializing constitutional adjudication.9" Justice
Brennan met the objection by stating that the issue involved First Amend-
ment rights and thus required constitutional interpretation, "a function ulti-
mately the responsibility of this Court." 9 Further, the plurality noted that
the state has no power to act impermissibly under the Constitution.9" It is
clear that the plurality intended no modification or interference with the
states' right to design and implement their own civil service systems. These
matters are properly ones for legislative concern. On the other hand, it is
unlikely that the legislative branch would censor its own patronage practices
and more importantly, the infringement on First Amendment rights is a
matter for judicial concern.
There was no actual disagreement among the justices that patronage
practices infringe First Amendment rights.99 The conflict arose from differ-
ing assessments as to the strength of the government interest in preserving
the patronage system and the magnitude of the First Amendment intrusion.
The dissenting opinion of Justice Powell stressed the history and tradition of
the patronage system as evidence of its importance to American political
life. But the plurality was unpersuaded by the system's 200 year history.
Patronage can be conceded to be part of the American tradition and still be
unconstitutional.' 0 The analogies to racial discrimination and denial of
women's suffrage serve as painful reminders that tradition is not sacrosanct:
"In any event, if the age of a pernicious practice were a sufficient reason for
its continued acceptance, the constitutional attack on racial discrimination
would, of course, have been doomed to failure."'
01
Of the three justifications advanced by patronage defenders and re-
96. "The judgment today unnecessarily constitutionalizes another element of
American life ...... Id. at 2697 (Powell, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 2679.
98. Id.
99. Justice Powell's opinion is equivocal in this respect. Beginning with the state-
ment, "It might well be possible to dispose of this case on the ground that it implicates
no First Amendment right of the respondents . . ." (id. at 2692-93) (Powell, J., dissent-
ing), Justice Powell next suggested that under the holding of Shapp, the employees had
waived their rights (id. at 2693), and finally went on to analyze the burden on First
Amendment rights in light of the government interests (id. at 2693-96). Chief Justice
Burger did not address the constitutional issue in his dissenting opinion.
100. 96 S. Ct. at 2687 n.22.
101. Illinois State Employees Union v. Lewis, 473 F.2d 561, 568 n.14 (7th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 943 (1973).
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jected by the plurality,1"2 the dissent challenged only the plurality's treat-
ment of thepatronage system's role in preserving the democratic process.
Justice Powell stressed that patronage practices have stimulated political
activity and strengthened political parties, making government more ac-
countable to the public.1"3 The dissent claimed that patronage has helped to
remove political affairs from the dominance of the "aristocratic class"'" 4
and is particularly important for local governments where rewards are
needed as incentives to carry out ongoing activities and minor political
"chores."' 0 5 The plurality opinion disparaged the contribution of patronage
practices, and the perfunctory dismissal of this interest weakened the plural-
ity argument. A more satisfactory approach would have been to admit that
patronage has played an important role in American politics with two neces-
sary qualifications. First, patronage may well have assisted in the develop-
ment and strengthening of American political parties in the past.0 6 It is of
declining importance today, however, due to changes in the organization
and style of American politics.' Second, it may well be vital that top-level
policy-making executives be able to choose their closest associates from the
same political party. The plurality conceded the validity of allowing patron-
age practices to continue in these circumstances. The dissent clearly ignored
this distinction in stating that "no alternative to some continuation of pat-
ronage practices is suggested."' 0 8
The opposite results reached by the plurality and dissent may also be
traced to the different standards of judicial review applied to the govern-
ment's and the dismissed employees' interests. The plurality required that if
the state action were "to survive constitutional challenge, it must further
some vital government end by a means that is least restrictive of freedom of
belief and association in achieving that end, and the benefit gained must
outweigh the loss of constitutionally protected rights.""°9 While this stan-
dard is less harsh than a strict scrutiny test in that it provides an element of
balancing the competing interests, the plurality imposed a heavier burden on
the government than did the dissent. The dissent required a sufficiently
important state interest to sustain what Justice Powell characterized as a
"relatively modest intrusion" on First Amendment rights." 0 The "substan-
tial contribution to the practical functioning of our democratic system""'
102. See text accompanying notes 79-86 supra.
103. 96 S. Ct. at 2694 (Powell, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 2692.
105. Id. at 2695.
106. See, e.g., C. FISH, THE CIVIL SERVICE AND THE PATRONAGE 156-57
(1905).
107. Sorauf, The Silent Revolution in Patronage, 20 PuB. ADMIN. REV. 28, 30-32
(1960).
108. 96 S. Ct. at 2696 (Powell, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 2685.




was the important state interest and "the coercion on associational choices
that may be created by one's desire initially to obtain employment"11 was
the intrusion on First Amendment rights. Justice Powell resolved the balanc-
ing in favor of the state saying: "The pressure to abandon one's beliefs and
associations to obtain government employment. . . does not seem to me to
assume impermissible proportions in light of the interests to be served."' 113
This intrusion was further justified because "the system leaves sig-
nificant room for individual political expression" ;114 according to the dis-
sent, patronage employees may vote freely and express themselves on some
political issues." 5 The dissent, in purporting to rely on the Court's decisions
in Perry v. Sindermann"6 and Pickering v. Board of Education,"' seems to
reveal its inconsistency in applying First Amendment principles. When em-
ployees in Perry and Pickering were dismissed due to their exercise of free
speech the Court reversed and recognized the employees' right freely to
express themselves." 8 If a patronage employee tried to express himself
politically in a manner contrary to his employer's views, he would be fired.
Under its reasoning in Elrod, the dissent would uphold the dismissal, a
result contrary to Perry and Pickering. By its very operation, the patronage
system leaves no "significant room for political expression" and the dissent
is clearly uncomfortable with that result.
The dissent also attempted to utilize the case of Buckley v. Valeo" 9 to
support its opinion but appeared to read the decision too broadly. In citing
Buckley's approval of the disclosure provisions of the Federal Election
Campaign Act Amendments of 1974,12° Justice Powell stressed the govern-
ment interest in increasing the overall level of political discourse despite an
adverse effect on individual First Amendment rights.' But the Buckley
opinion did not suggest that the overall level of political discourse is a more
important interest in all cases than the individual's freedom of political
association. On the Buckley record the Court found that the impact of the
disclosure requirements on freedom of association was "highly specula-
tive,"' 22 and made provision for a showing of actual injury that could
overcome a presumption of constitutionality in specific cases. 23 Further, the
112. Id. at 2696.
113. Id. at 2696-97.
114. Id. at 2696.
115. Id.
116. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
117. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
118. 408 U.S. at 596-97; 391 U.S. at 568.
119. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
120. Pub. L. No. 93-443, 83 Stat. 1263 (codified in scattered sections of 2, 5, 18,
26 & 47 U.S.C.).
121. 96 S. Ct. at 2695 n.9.
122. 424 U.S. at 70.
123. Id. at 71.
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Court noted that the disclosure requirements appeared to be the least restric-
tive means of accomplishing the government purpose.' 2 4 By contrast, the
effect of patronage dismissals on freedom of association is direct and im-
mediate, and such dismissals are not the least restrictive means available.
The dissent emphasized that the Court has upheld restraints on the First
Amendment rights of public employees and cited Civil Service Commission
v. National Association of Letter Carriers25 to support its position. But the
policy underlying the holding of Letter Carriers better supports the plurality
position. The Court in Letter Carriers upheld the provisions of the Hatch
Act"26 so that the government might operate efficiently and fairly and so that
employees would be free from improper influences. 12 The provisions of the
Hatch Act did not dictate an employee's choice of political party or belief
but rather restricted his degree of activity within his chosen party. A major
goal of the Hatch Act was to free government service from political obliga-
tions by reducing the opportunity for political bosses to build "corrupt
political machines" and by relieving government employees of political
pressures to conform and curry favor from their superiors. 28 Thus, the
policies behind the Hatch Act and the elimination of patronage appear to be
in accord.
IH. The Future of Patronage Practices
The Elrod decision left undecided several issues related to the patron-
age question. First, there remains a potential problem in applying the dis-
tinction between policy-making and non-policy-making employees to certain
types of employment where the nature of the duties is not easily defined. The
.plurality indicated that a court will consider whether the employee acts as an
advisor or formulates plans for the implementation of broad goals." 9 The
concurring opinion referred to confidential employees.1' A title alone does
not provide the answer in each case. A "supervisor" may have many
responsibilities, but those responsibilities may have only limited and well-
defined objectives."' The degree of discretion that an employee can exercise
in his job may be a guide. The final resolution must depend upon the
circumstances of the case and the nature of the responsibilities.
Another problem in patronage dismissals is proving that the dismissal
was for political reasons. The Elrod decision did not change the fact that
employers may dismiss non-civil service employees without giving a reason
124. Id. at 68.
125. 413 U.S. 548 (1973).
126. 5 U.S.C. §§ 7321-27 (1970 & Supp. V 1975); see note 21 supra.
127. See text accompanying notes 19-22 supra.
128. 413 U.S. at 565-66.
129. 96 S. Ct. at 2687.
130. Id. at 2690 (Stewart, J., concurring in the result).
131. Id. at 2687.
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and cannot be compelled to do so. A politician could fire incumbent office-
holders and specify reasons unrelated to political beliefs. This possibility
places a heavy burden of proof on the employee, for it is the former em-
ployee who has the burden of showing that the discharge was motivated by a
constitutionally impermissible purpose. Unless there is a mass firing such as
occurred in Illinois State Employees Union v. Lewis132 or American Federa-
tion of State, County and Municipal Employees v. Shapp,1"3 or the reason is
expressly given as in Alomar v. Dwyer..4 and Elrod, the plaintiff may lack
sufficient proof to establish a First Amendment violation. The problem is
illustrated by the case of Indiana State Employees Association v. Negley. " 5
Despite the prior decision in Lewis, the court denied preliminary injunctive
relief restraining the pending dismissals. The evidence presented a sharp
factual dispute between the parties. The employees claimed that their dis-
missals by the state superintendent were motivated solely by their party
affiliation and political campaign activism, while Negley claimed his princi-
pal reasons for discharging the emplQyees were lack of experience, political
sabotage, low moral character, lack of ability, and conflicting loyalties. The
evidence was also inconclusive as to whether the employees could be clas-
sified as non-policy-making.1 36 The court observed that, at least at that point
in the proceedings, the employees had not sustained their burden of proof.137
The Elrod decision also left open the question of patronage hirings as
opposed to patronage firings. The language in both the plurality and dissent-
ing opinions is ambiguous in this regard. The specific holding of the plural-
ity was that "the practice of patronage dismissals is unconstitutional under
the First and Fourteenth Amendments." ' 13 Though the plurality stated,
"[W]e are here concerned only with the constitutionality of dismissing
public employees for partisan reasons,"' 39 Justice Brennan in his broad
indictment of patronage practices condemned, at least by implication, hiring
as well as firing for patronage reasons.1 41 Justice Stewart clearly limited his
132. 473 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 943 (1973).
133. 443 Pa. 527, 280 A.2d 375 (1971).
134. 447 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1020 (1972).
135. 357 F. Supp. 38 (S.D. Ind. 1973). According to the affidavit of defendant
Harold Negley, 80 employees of the Department of Public Instruction were interviewed
with respect to their retention or dismissal under his administration. Negley indicated his
intention to retain 63 employees and dismiss 17 employees. Because the Department of
Public Instruction had over 300 employees, the court did not consider this as a wholesale
replacement along party lines. Id. at 41 n.3.
136. Id. at 41-42.
137. At the trial, the court reviewed the duties and responsibilities of the individual
plaintiffs in detail and held that they had occupied policy-making positions. Indiana State
Employees Ass'n v. Negley, 365 F. Supp. 225, 227-31 (S.D. Ind. 1973), aff'd, 501 F.2d
1239 (7th Cir. 1974).
138. 96 S. Ct. at 2689 (emphasis added).
139. Id. at 2680 (emphasis added).
140. Id. at 2681-82.
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concurring opinion to the dismissal situation.141 The dissenting opinion of
Justice Powell, on the other hand, consistently framed the issue as one
concerning patronage hiring practices. 42 If the broad plurality opinion can
be read as going beyond the facts of the case to condemn all patronage
practices, the dissenting opinion is equally broad in defending those prac-
tices.
IV. Conclusion
The Court's holding in Elrod v. Burns 43 overturned 200 years of
American political tradition. Yet Justice Brennan's plurality opinion is a
logical extension of the constitutional principles previously enunciated by
the Supreme Court in the numerous decisions regarding the conditioning of
public employment on infringement of First Amendment rights. The Court's
decisions have prohibited conditions on public benefits, such as jobs that
generally dampen the exercise of First Amendment rights. Having estab-
lished that freedom of political association and belief is a fundamental right
guaranteed by the First Amendment and that the state may not infringe such
a right in the absence of a legitimate interest, the issue is resolved by
balancing the government interests and the individual rights. Is the benefit to
the government in maintaining control of public employment, through pa-
tronage practices more important than the loss of the employees' First
Amendment rights? The Court's struggle with the competing interests indi-
cates that the answer is neither easy nor necessarily obvious, and that a
decision will be colored not only by tradition and precedent but also by one's
philosophy of the government's role in society and the relative importance
of individual rights.
The arguments advanced by the dissenters in Elrod to justify the con-
tinuation of patronage practices seem to be an unpersuasive call to maintain
the status quo. Patronage practices may well have played an important and
necessary role in the evolution of the democratic process in America, but
tradition must be a guide, not a dictator. The necessities of the political
parties in the past are not determinative of their current needs. Stable politi-
cal parties are undoubtedly desirable in a democratic form of government,
but there is no real evidence that patronage is essential to their existence.
The plurality opinion in Elrod provides the means whereby the government
can accommodate its interests in a manner less restrictive of associational
freedoms. By allowing patronage dismissals of policy-making employees
the government's interests are served without unnecessarily restricting the
rights of all public employees. And finally, even non-policy-making em-
ployees are subject to discharge for poor job performance or insubordina-
tion.
141. Id. at 2690 (Stewart, J., concurring in the result).
142. Id. at 2693-97 (Powell, J., dissenting).
143. 96 S. Ct. 2673 (1976).
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Is the party really over? The Elrod decision provides a constitutional
basis for invalidating the practice of patronage dismissals. Despite the lack
of a majority opinion in Elrod, a majority of the justices agreed that non-
policy-making employees could not be discharged because of their political
affiliation. Justice Stevens did not participate in the decision, but his opinion
in Lewis indicates his ideological concurrence with the other five justices.
Only the three dissenting justices in Elrod appear to be adamant defenders of
patronage.
It is uncertain that a majority of the Court would hold patronage hiring
practices unconstitutional. Job holders who stand to lose not only their jobs
but also their seniority and other benefits could be held to have more at stake
than mere job applicants. Yet the constitutional infringement is essentially
the same where a potential employee is denied a position due to his political
affiliation or is required to surrender that association to obtain public em-
ployment. The government interests advanced by patronage defenders-
efficient and effective government, full implementation of policies by loyal
employees, and preservation of the democratic process-are no more jus-
tified in the hiring situation. It would seem that those very interests would be
best served by qualified, capable, and experienced personnel, regardless of
political affiliation. The patronage hiring situation would impose a heavier
burden of proof on the rejected applicant to show that his rejection was
solely for reasons of political affiliation and was unaffected by the myriad of
other employment criteria. Nevertheless, when the hiring situation does
come before the Court, the Elrod principles must be extended to invalidate
patronage hiring practices if the mandate of the First Amendment is to be
faithfully executed.
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